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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1715 
______________ 
 
MHA LLC, D/B/A Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HEALTHFIRST, INC.; 
HEALTHFIRST HEALTH PLAN OF NEW JERSEY, INC.; 
SENIOR HEALTH PARTNERS, INC.; 
MANAGED HEALTH, INC.; 
HF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC; 
HEALTHFIRST PHSP, INC.; 
ABC COMPANIES 1-100; 
JOHN DOES 1-100 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-06036) 
District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:   November 17, 2015) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 MHA, the owner of Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center, appeals the dismissal 
with prejudice of its suit against HealthFirst, Inc. and other related companies for 
reimbursement for medical services provided to HealthFirst’s Medicare and Medicaid 
enrollees.  Because the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, we will vacate the 
District Court’s dismissal order and remand with instructions to remand the case to state 
court. 
I 
HealthFirst is the parent company of HealthFirst Health Plan of New Jersey, Inc., 
a privately owned insurance company that offers health insurance plans under Medicare 
Part C.  It is also a licensed Medicaid health management organization and managed care 
organization.  Between 2010 and 2013, Meadowlands Hospital billed HealthFirst for 
medical care provided to HealthFirst’s Medicare and Medicaid enrollees.  Because MHA 
did not have a contract with HealthFirst specifying agreed-upon rates, Medicare and 
Medicaid law governed both whether reimbursement was available for the care provided 
and the reimbursement rate.  MHA asserts that because it was an out-of-network 
provider, HealthFirst delayed and/or denied reimbursements to pressure MHA into 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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signing a contract with HealthFirst to become an in-network provider.  To this end, MHA 
claims that HealthFirst improperly asserted that certain services were not authorized or 
did not qualify as emergency care, wrongly denied claims as untimely, and/or ignored or 
refused to process them.  In total, MHA was reimbursed for only $2.5 million out of the 
$28.9 million it claims that it was owed.   
MHA filed a complaint in state court alleging that HealthFirst violated New Jersey 
regulations governing reimbursements to out-of-network providers under Medicaid.  
MHA also brought claims for unjust enrichment and “quantum meruit—implied 
contract.”1  App. 51-53.  HealthFirst removed the suit to federal court and MHA moved 
for remand, but withdrew that motion before it was decided.   
HealthFirst moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and MHA cross-moved for leave to file an amended complaint.  The 
District Court dismissed MHA’s Medicaid-based claims because it failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing suit and MHA’s Medicare-based claims because 
they were preempted by federal Medicare law.  The District Court denied MHA’s motion 
to amend the complaint as futile.  MHA appeals. 
                                                 
1 MHA voluntarily dismissed its claims for fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentation, equitable and promissory estoppel, and breach of fair dealing through 
unfair claims settlement practices.  
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II2 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a case can only be removed to 
a federal district court if the case could have originally been filed there.3  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(a).  This requires a showing that the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction. 
Where, as here, no diversity jurisdiction is alleged, jurisdiction ordinarily rests on 
the presence of a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.  See Merrell Dow 
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).  When a complaint alleges only 
state law claims, federal jurisdiction may also exist where federal law completely 
preempts a state law claim or where a state law claim raises a substantial embedded 
federal issue that can be addressed by the federal courts without disturbing congressional 
intent.4  See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
313-14 (2005) (narrow exception for certain embedded federal issues); Beneficial Nat’l 
Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (jurisdiction based on complete preemption). 
HealthFirst asserts three possible grounds for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) that 
HealthFirst is entitled to “federal officer removal” under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); (2) that 
                                                 
2 The District Court asserted jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but the 
propriety of this is disputed.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
conduct plenary review of subject matter jurisdiction.  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City 
Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1994).   
3 “The removing party . . . carries a heavy burden of showing that at all stages of 
the litigation the case is properly before the federal court.  Removal statutes are to be 
strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of remand.”  Brown v. Jevic, 
575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 4 Neither party asserts that complete preemption creates jurisdiction here. 
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MHA asserts a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) that MHA’s 
Medicare-based state law claims “arise under” federal law based on the framework set 
forth in Grable.  
We will not entertain HealthFirst’s assertion of federal officer removal, as this was 
not a basis for removal claimed in the notice of removal.  While it may be permissible to 
add further detail to jurisdictional allegations, a defendant may not rely on an entirely 
new basis for jurisdiction not set forth in the removal petition.  See USX Corp. v. 
Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 203-05 (3d Cir. 2003) (determining that jurisdiction was 
proper because amendment to notice of removal “did not add new jurisdictional facts . . . 
[or] rely on a basis of jurisdiction different from that originally alleged”); see also In re 
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 590 n.8 (4th Cir. 2006) (defense 
contractor could not assert federal officer removal on appeal because it had “failed to 
raise this issue before the district court”). 
Jurisdiction also cannot be asserted here on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While 
the complaint cites § 1983, this language appears in a background section,5 and none of 
                                                 
5 The complaint’s sole references to § 1983 read as follows: 
 
60.  Medicaid MCOs must pay non-plan providers promptly for 
“emergency services” furnished to their enrollees without regard to a prior 
authorization from the MCO. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(2)(1)(vii), 1396b(m), 
1396u-2(b), 1395mm(g)(6)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 438.114. HFNJ is liable to 
plaintiff as a Medicaid MCO for payment for emergency services under the 
Act, pursuant to SSA § 1923(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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the six counts assert a claim based on it.  Moreover, the fact that HealthFirst did not move 
to dismiss a claim under § 1983, and MHA did not seek to avoid dismissal based upon 
the existence of a § 1983 claim, further reveals that no party viewed the complaint as 
seeking relief under § 1983.  Thus, § 1983 does not provide a basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
HealthFirst’s final proposed source of jurisdiction, so called “arising under” or 
“embedded” jurisdiction, also does not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in 
this case.  This is a “special and small” category of cases requiring three elements.  
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006).  First, the 
plaintiff’s state law claim must “necessarily raise a stated federal issue,”  Grable, 545 
U.S. at 314, meaning that an element of the state law claim requires construction of 
federal law.  Manning, 772 F.3d at 163.  Second, this federal element must be “actually 
disputed and substantial.”  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.  With respect to this factor, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
61.  HFNJ is known as a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (“MCO”), 
and is required to promptly pay claims. Federal prompt payment 
requirements have been found enforceable by providers under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  See, e.g., National Med. Care, Inc. v. Rullan, 2005 LEXIS 27994 
(D.P.R. Nov. 1, 2005).  
. . .  
71.  Accordingly, HFNJ is liable to Plaintiff as a Medicaid MCO for 
payment for emergency services under the Act, pursuant to SSA § 
1923(b)(2); and enrollees must be protected against liability, even if the 
MCO is not paid by the State, and for any services furnished by “a provider 
with a contractual, referral or other arrangement with the organization.”  § 
1932(b)(6); 42 C.F.R. § 438.106(c), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
App. 36, 38-39.  
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Supreme Court has distinguished cases such as Grable that present a “nearly pure issue of 
law” that would govern numerous other cases, from those that are “fact-bound and 
situation-specific.”  Empire, 547 U.S. at 700-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Relatedly, for a case to involve a “substantial” federal issue, it must be one significant “to 
the federal system” as opposed to only the parties.6  Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 
1065-66 (2013).  Third, the case must be one “which a federal forum may entertain 
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.”  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.     
As to the first factor, HealthFirst has failed to establish that it is necessary to 
construe federal law to determine whether MHA can establish the elements of its claims 
for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.  These claims essentially require MHA to 
show that it provided a service to HealthFirst for which it was not fairly compensated. 
See, e.g., Montich v. Miele USA, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 439, 459 (D.N.J. 2012) (elements 
of unjust enrichment include defendant’s receipt of a benefit without just payment); 
Canadian Nat. Ry. v. Vertis, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (D.N.J. 2011) (elements of 
quantum meruit include an expectation of reasonable compensation for services 
provided).  MHA claims fair compensation is the “reasonable value of labor performed 
                                                 
6 The prototypical case of Grable jurisdiction is one in which the federal 
government itself seeks access to a federal forum, an action of the federal government 
must be adjudicated, or where the validity of a federal statute is in question.  Gunn, 133 
S.Ct. at 1066; see also Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (citing Smith v Kansas City Title & Trust 
Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), in which the principal issue was the constitutionality of the 
federal government’s action to issue a bond, as the “classic example” of embedded 
federal jurisdiction). 
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and the market value of the materials furnished.”  App. 53 (quotation marks omitted).  
The fact that federal law may be informative of a market rate or “shape or even limit the 
remedy that Plaintiff may obtain” does not mean that federal law is a necessary 
component of the cause of action.  Veneruso v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 
933 F. Supp. 2d 613, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 604 (2d Cir. 2014). 
That HealthFirst may point to the Medicare law as part of its defense also does not 
make federal law a “necessary” part of MHA’s claim.  HealthFirst’s arguments that 
Medicare regulations will demonstrate that the services rendered were not covered or the 
reimbursement claims exceed Medicare’s cap are more “properly characterized as a 
defense to the Plaintiffs’ state-law reimbursement claim” rather than a required element 
of MHA’s claims.  PremierTox, Inc. v. Kentucky Spirit Health Plan, Inc., No. 1:12CV-
00010, 2012 WL 1950424, at *7 (W.D. Ky. May 30, 2012) (dispute over whether care 
was “medically necessary” under federal Medicaid regulations did not raise a federal 
issue under Grable); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Wellcare of Florida, Inc., 
No. 10-22858-CIV, 2011 WL 2084003, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011) (whether federal 
law capped Medicaid reimbursement of hospital “amount[ed] to a federal-law defense to 
the amount of damages [HMO might] owe” and “[did] not make [the] case removable.”); 
Veneruso, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (collecting cases).  Thus, HealthFirst’s reliance on the 
services and reimbursement amounts set forth in the Medicare law to justify its payment 
decisions is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.  See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 
386, 393 (1987).   
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Even if we assume that construction of the Medicare Act will be required to 
determine MHA’s prima facie entitlement to relief, the federal issues raised by this case 
are not “actually disputed and substantial” as required under the second factor.  Grable, 
545 U.S. at 314.  First, any statutory interpretation required by this case is incidental to 
the application of Medicare and Medicaid law to disputed facts.  See MHA, LLC v. 
UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 13-6130, 2014 WL 223176, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2014) 
(remanding a nearly identical case to state court because the federal issue raised was “not 
substantial and disputed,” but rather “incidental” and capable of resolution in state court).  
The parties have not identified a dispute over the meaning of particular statutory text; 
rather, HealthFirst generally avers that the parties disagree over the application of the 
Medicare Act to their situation.  Thus, we are not presented with a discrete federal issue 
that is “dispositive of the case and would be controlling in numerous other cases.”  
Empire, 547 U.S. at 700; cf. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 457 F. 
Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding jurisdiction under Grable where the 
“determination of the actual meaning [of a specific term] under the Medicare statute has 
been hotly disputed in the multi-district litigation”).   
 Second, this case does not present the unusually strong federal interest required to 
qualify for the federal forum.  This suit does not call into question the validity of a federal 
statute or the conduct of a federal actor.  See, e.g., Main & Assocs., Inc. v. Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Ala., 776 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (“Empire 
emphasized that the key factors in Grable which made the exercise of federal court 
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jurisdiction appropriate included the fact that the dispute in Grable centered on the action 
of a federal agency and the compatibility of that action with federal law.”); Veneruso, 
933 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (explaining that where “a federal actor” is not a party, a case is 
“unlikely to impact the federal government’s interests or its ability to vindicate those 
interests of the Medicaid statute through administrative action”) (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 
While HealthFirst argues that there is a substantial federal interest in ensuring the 
uniform development of Medicare law, state courts are plainly competent to apply the 
Medicare Act to state law claims.  If they were not, “the extremely rare exception 
discussed in [Grable and its progeny] would swallow up the general rule.”  Pritika v. 
Moore, 91 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Meyer v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1270 
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (“[T]he state courts’ handling of cases such as this one, where the 
interpretation of the federal Medicare law [wa]s but one part of the underlying lawsuit, 
[would] not meaningfully encroach upon the work of the federal courts in construing the 
Medicare statutes.”); Hawaii v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 842, 856 (D. Haw. 
2006) (“[I]f Congress had thought that . . . Medicare provisions implicated a substantial 
federal interest, it could have ensured that only federal courts would hear such cases.  It 
did not.”).  A state court is the appropriate forum for this “fact-bound and situation-
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specific” case involving the application of Medicaid and Medicare laws.  Empire, 547 
U.S. at 701.7 
Because this case does not “necessarily raise” a federal issue that is “actually 
disputed and substantial,” the federal court may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction 
based on “embedded jurisdiction.”  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.8 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, HealthFirst has not carried its burden as the removing 
party to show that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and 
                                                 
7 Grable jurisdiction was found to be appropriate in a similar suit against a health 
insurance company offering Medicare benefits.  See New York City Health and Hosps. 
Corp. v. WellCare of New York, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The 
plaintiff there brought breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.  Id. at 252.  The 
contract at issue required compliance with provisions of the Medicare law.  Id. at 256.  
The district court exercised jurisdiction over the claim under Grable based in part on 
Second Circuit precedent emphasizing that a “complex federal regulatory scheme” is 
evidence of a federal interest in using a federal forum.  Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 
418 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 2005).  In our view, the fact that a regulatory scheme needs to 
be consulted to resolve a dispute is insufficient on its own to make a federal issue 
“substantial” under Grable.  In addition, after the district court dismissed the contract 
claim, it remanded the unjust enrichment claim for lack of jurisdiction.  This is consistent 
with our view that proof of unjust enrichment does not require consideration of federal 
Medicare law.  See New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. WellCare of New York, 
Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 126, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
8 As the first two elements of Grable’s conjunctive test were not satisfied, we need 
not reach the third factor, which considers whether taking jurisdiction over cases such as 
this one would disturb the “congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities” described in Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.  See, e.g., Fairfax Fin. Holdings 
Ltd. v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 06-CV-4197, 2007 WL 1456204, at *5 (D.N.J. 
May 15, 2007) (“Having concluded that the first and second Grable factors are not 
satisfied, this Court need not consider the third factor . . . [which] is only a possible veto 
that may defeat federal jurisdiction, not sustain it.”); MHA v. UnitedHealth, 2014 WL 
223176, at *8 (same); Main & Assocs., 776 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (same). 
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we will therefore vacate the dismissal of MHA’s claims and remand to the District Court 
with instructions to remand this case to state court. 
